From Bin Laden to more "local" groups, Al Qaeda has not yet disappeared: What happens to the terrorist organization today?

2026-09-11 21:18:39Kosova&Bota SHKRUAR NGA REDAKSIA VOX
From Bin Laden to more "local" groups, Al Qaeda has not yet
Osama Bin Laden

Analysis by Guido Olimpio – Corriere della Sera

On September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda shocked the world with its terrorist attacks on the United States, entering history as one of the most dangerous terrorist organizations of the early 21st century.

The attacks against the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon marked the beginning of a new era in global security policy and brought about an international military response that would last for decades.

But even though its leadership has been severely damaged and its capacity to mount global attacks has been diminished, Al Qaeda has not disappeared.

The history of the organization is closely linked to Osama bin Laden, who in the 1990s led Al Qaeda towards a global confrontation with the United States and its allies. After declaring war on the Americans in 1996, his network was involved in a series of attacks that culminated in September 11, 2001. The American response was immediate and long-lasting: the intervention in Afghanistan, the war against Al Qaeda structures and the subsequent invasion of Iraq created a long period of conflict that changed the political and security balance in the Middle East.

Over the years that followed, Al Qaeda lost much of its central structure. Many of its leaders and commanders were killed or captured. The most symbolic blow came in 2011, when Osama bin Laden was killed during a US operation in Abbottabad, Pakistan.

Another significant blow came in 2022, when Ayman al-Zawahiri, Bin Laden's successor, was killed in Kabul. However, the elimination of the leaders did not bring about the end of the organization.

On the contrary, Al Qaeda changed the way it operated. From a relatively centralized structure, it evolved into a more distributed network, with regional branches taking on a much greater role. This has made the organization less visible on the international stage, but has allowed it to adapt to local realities.

One of the most significant changes in the jihadist landscape was the emergence of the Islamic State. ISIS became for a time the main rival of Al Qaeda, presenting itself as a more aggressive organization and aiming to create a directly controlled territory. Within a few years, the Islamic State managed to control large areas in Iraq and Syria and attract thousands of fighters from various countries.

However, the Islamic State also faced a major military campaign and lost most of the territory it had conquered. This did not mean the jihadist threat had disappeared. Both Al Qaeda and ISIS adapted to the new reality by relying more on local structures and more dispersed cells.

Today, a significant portion of Al Qaeda-linked activity is conducted through regional branches. In West Africa, particularly in the Sahel region, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, known as JNIM, is one of the most important structures affiliated with the network. Political instability, local conflicts, the weakness of state institutions, and large territorial expanses have created favorable conditions for armed groups.

JNIM has been involved in fighting and other violent activities in several countries in the Sahel, including Mali and surrounding areas. The group takes advantage of the difficulties of states to control territory and of local conflicts. This also indicates a shift in the way Al Qaeda operates: instead of focusing solely on spectacular international attacks, its branches aim to build influence within concrete local conflicts.

In the Horn of Africa, Al-Shabaab remains one of the most powerful Al Qaeda-affiliated groups. The organization has retained capabilities for terrorist attacks and guerrilla warfare, while also engaging in criminal and financial activities that enable it to maintain its capabilities. Despite numerous operations against it, Al-Shabaab has shown a remarkable ability to adapt and survive.

In the Arabian Peninsula, Al Qaeda, or AQAP, has historically been one of the most important branches of the network. Yemen, due to the long conflict and the weakness of state institutions, has provided a favorable terrain for armed organizations. AQAP has had ambitions in the past to strike Western targets and has played a significant role in Al Qaeda's history after September 11.

Structures and networks linked to Al Qaeda ideology continue to exist in South Asia. However, the landscape is much more fragmented than in the early 2000s. Today, it is no longer an organization that directly controls all its branches from a single center. It is more of a decentralized network, where local groups have considerable room to act according to their circumstances.

This is one reason why Al Qaeda continues to be considered a threat, even though it is no longer the organization it was in bin Laden's time. It has lost the ability to dominate the global discourse on terrorism in the same way it did after 9/11, but it has retained an ideology and structures that can profit from conflict, political chaos, and the lack of state control.

Another important change is the nature of the threat in the West. Today, authorities are not only faced with large organizations that plan attacks from afar. There is also the risk of individuals who are radicalized online, inspired by extremist propaganda, and acting without necessarily having a direct connection to a terrorist structure. This makes it more difficult to detect plans for attacks early.

In this sense, Al Qaeda has moved from a model of spectacular, centralized terrorism to a more distributed one. The organization is no longer the center of global attention it was two decades ago, but its branches have found space to operate in areas where the state is weak and conflicts are ongoing.


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