The magistrates' salary crisis is testing the entire accountability mechanism that justice reform established. It is testing what judges we have elected, what prosecutors we have chosen, but above all what governance institutions for justice we have produced from a reform that now itself needs lawyers.
So far, the executive branch, i.e. the government, has openly confronted the judicial branch, rejecting their self-determination of salaries and then filing lawsuits for non-implementation of their own decisions against those who prevent them from self-determining salaries.
The battle clearly shows the positions of the parties, whether impartial or official.
Only one institution, the most important for controlling the power of justice, the High Inspector of Justice, which should control justice when it goes off the rails, has remained silent.
Law No. 115/2016 clearly defines the ILD as the authority responsible for verifying complaints, investigating disciplinary violations and initiating disciplinary proceedings against judges and prosecutors. Article 194 of this law even gives the High Inspector the right to initiate an investigation ex officio, based on public data.
Artur Metani does not need to wait for someone to deliver an envelope with the name Nesti Angoni to his office to get things moving, as is the tradition of the new justice system. The conflict is public and the financial consequences are public.
If the government's allegations are true and the magistrates have used judicial power to produce a financial benefit for themselves, then we have a case that falls squarely into ILD territory.
Article 101 of the Law on the Status of Magistrates considers as a disciplinary offense the failure to refer to the law or the facts, intentionally or due to gross negligence, as well as actions that damage public confidence in the judicial system. Article 102 includes intentionally unreasonable decisions, when they are the result of personal interest or malice. While Article 103 qualifies as a violation the use of the status of a magistrate to create benefits for oneself or for others.
But the ILD was created precisely to separate the lawful decision from the abuse. It must verify whether the decisions were made in a conflict of interest, are intentionally unreasonable or constitute the use of status for personal gain. The ILD must then launch an investigation and, if it proves the violation, request the relevant disciplinary measure from the High Judicial Council.
This is why Metani's silence is not neutral. It defends the existing situation produced by the magistrates, becoming a party without judging this situation.
At this point, the responsibility of the Assembly begins.
The Assembly has the right and duty to demand an explanation as to whether the ILD has initiated an ex officio verification, whether it considers the claims against the magistrates unfounded, and why it is deliberately avoiding confronting its institution with this conflict.
This institution exists precisely for cases like this. If it doesn't even address this case, it's useless to even exist.
This issue cannot end with magistrates reporting the government and the government publicly complaining about the magistrates, while the system's disciplinary watchdog remains silent.
Either the magistrates have applied the law and the decisions should be executed, or they have used their power for their own interests and should be investigated.
If Artur Metani refuses to provide this answer through the exercise of his duties, then the Assembly must initiate the procedure to verify his responsibility.
There can be no third way, where everyone accuses each other, and the institution that should protect the accountability of justice continues to sleep on this case, even covering its head with a blanket, so that no one can see that it is alive.