
A judge's independence is not only tested when faced with political power, a powerful interest, or external pressure. Sometimes, the most difficult test of independence is facing the very institution where he or she serves.
It is precisely this constitutional principle that has been put to the test by the conflict between the Special Court against Corruption and Organized Crime and the National Chamber of Advocates. A conflict that arose neither from the judges nor from any individual abusive behavior of the lawyers, but from an administrative decision-making of the court, opposed by lawyers and journalists for violating the rights of defense, publicity of the trial, and the powers of the judicial bodies.
So, the origin of the conflict is not the judges, but the court administration.
Instead of the conflict remaining between the administrative body that issued the act and the subjects who contested its legality, it moved to the courtroom. Judges began to impose fines on lawyers who implemented the boycott decision of the National Chamber of Advocates. Thus, an administrative conflict is turning into a confrontation between judges and lawyers.
But judges are not parties to this conflict and should not become so.
Of course, the court has the obligation to guarantee the development of the process and prevent unjustified obstacles. But it must exercise this obligation by individually assessing the circumstances of each process and the behavior of each defense attorney. The power to impose a procedural fine is not an institutional “whip”. It serves to assess a specific behavior, in a specific process, on specific grounds.
The series of fines with similar amounts and justifications raises a serious concern: is the individual behavior of the lawyer being assessed, or is judicial authority being used to counter the decision of the Chamber of Advocates?
The judge is not obligated to sympathize with the court administration, to protect its prestige, or to discipline the legal profession. He is obligated to apply the law, even when this means disagreeing with the court leaders, even when it means deciding differently from his colleagues.
This is where independence is tested.
This conflict has also deepened the crisis of trust between the institutions and actors that are supposed to guarantee justice. The court, the legal profession, and the media do not have the same functions or powers, but each, within its own role, serves a fundamental guarantee of the rule of law: the exercise of justice under the control of the law and the public.
The lawyer is not subordinate to the court. The journalist is not subordinate to its administration. The judge is not subordinate to the administrative leaders of the institution. Each exercises an independent function that must be respected.
Respect does not imply conformity, nor a lack of control. But control cannot be transformed into institutional hostility, and legal powers cannot be used to discipline or subjugate a constitutional profession. The rule of law requires respect for the powers of each, good faith in their exercise, and lawful control when they are exceeded. Otherwise, institutions begin to protect or fight each other, instead of protecting the law.
Through this sanctioning behavior towards actors who contribute to the realization of justice, the very impartiality of justice is questioned. A court does not become stronger when judges hold the same position, but when each is free to decide according to the law and his professional conviction. The authority of a judicial decision does not stem from the uniformity of decisions or from institutional “muscle”, but from the independence, quality and legality of the exercise of the function.
Therefore, the issue is not how many fines have been imposed, how severe they are, or who will be the first to withdraw, but whether the judge has maintained his independence from institutional conflict or has used his constitutional function to subjugate and discipline the legal profession.
A judge who feels obligated to protect the institution he works for risks becoming no longer an arbitrator, but a party.
The judge is not there to protect the court from the law.
It is there to protect the law, even from the court itself.