The adoption of Decision No. 13, dated 2.11.2026, by the Meeting of Judges of the Constitutional Court — through which the annex on judicial procedures during the consideration of cases of reassessment jurisdiction was approved — marks a disturbing and unacceptable deviation from the constitutional architecture of the country. This act is not simply a bureaucratic prolongation of a transitional regime that ended on June 17, 2026, but an open violation of the sovereignty of constitutional justice through the legitimization of unprecedented foreign interventions. It is intolerable how the foreign bureaucrats of the ONM, paid handsomely with taxpayers' money, continue to behave like colonial rulers over Albanian justice, exceeding every limit of their mandate and going so far as to enter the very sanctuary of the deliberation room.
1. The Presence of the ONM in the Advisory Chamber: Foreign Paternalism and Violation of Independence
Article 5, point 2/c of the adopted annex provides that international observers of the International Monitoring Operation (IMO) shall be present during all stages, including the 'deliberation and decision-making chamber'. This constitutes the height of legal absurdity and a scandalous violation of the basic standards of due process.
The deliberation room is the sacred, secret and inviolable space where the Constitutional Court’s judicial body deliberates freely, without pressure, confidentially and completely independently to form its legal opinion. Allowing foreign bureaucrats from the ONM — who, comfortable in luxurious positions, are not accountable to Albanian citizens — inside the deliberation room blatantly alters the nature of the Constitutional Court. This transforms it from an independent sovereign court into an externally controlled protectorate, where judicial decision-making is monitored in real time by individuals who only protect bureaucratic agendas and not the rule of law.
2. Violation of the Principle of Temporality and Creation of a Permanent Extraordinary Regime
The transitional review regime (vetting) was conceived as an exceptional and temporary measure, with strictly defined deadlines. With the end of the KPA mandate on 17.06.2026, the Constitution expressly provides in Article 179/b, point 9, the obligation of the Assembly to repeal this annex. Instead, through this decision of the Constitutional Court and under pressure from foreign bureaucrats who want to keep their seats, an attempt is being made to install a permanent extraordinary regime, keeping the investigative structures alive under the rug.
3. Open Violation of the Principle of Separation and Balance of Powers
The Constitutional Court has the duty to protect the constitutional balance and the principle of separation of powers. By agreeing to adopt hybrid rules where foreign bureaucrats enter the deliberation room and where the Court itself takes on the role of a review body, it falls into a flagrant conflict of interest. A court that becomes a party to an investigative-administrative process cannot then be a neutral court of constitutional control on these issues.
4. The Illegality of the Extension of 'Unfinished Cases' and Strasbourg Decisions
The attempt to introduce into the so-called 'unfinished cases' situations that are not related to the case at hand, including the artificial treatment of decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (Strasbourg) as a pretext for reopening new investigation cycles, demonstrates a clear will of bureaucratic circles to avoid the legal conclusion of the vetting. Strasbourg decisions require the implementation of the Convention standards, but they can never serve as fuel to keep an outdated machine alive.
cONcluSiON
Decision No. 13, dated 2.11.2026, of the Constitutional Court is not simply a procedural error; it is a frontal blow to the sovereignty of the rule of law. The inclusion of ONM bureaucrats in the consulting room — who receive the staggering salaries of international and domestic taxpayers to openly violate our institutional independence — constitutes a humiliating precedent. In the absence of action by the Assembly to implement Article 179/b, point 9, of the Constitution, this decision legalizes a colonial perpetuation of vetting, collapsing the foundations of legal certainty.