Is a NATO emerging in Asia? The thesis, or rather the alarm, comes from Beijing. In fact, this is how the Chinese government media presents the tripartite summit that this Friday brings together the leaders of the United States, Japan and South Korea at Camp David. The way the Chinese media describes it may seem a bit of hyperbole, but it is also true that the summit is defined as historic: no similar event has ever been held in that format, much less in a place with so many memories as the presidential residence in Camp David. The agreement between the three countries actually contains many innovations; and it is oriented towards creating a defensive shield against the two main threats in that area: first of all the belligerent and unpredictable North Korea, then the People's Republic of China itself.
One of the salient aspects – and one that Xi Jinping cannot easily grasp – is precisely the tripartite format. Bilateral alliances, between the US and Japan on the one hand, and between the US and South Korea on the other, have existed for many decades. However, until now it was impossible to "close the triangle" because a series of historical disputes poisoned relations between Tokyo and Seoul, especially issues related to the Japanese occupation during World War II. The climate has changed as the two leaders have decided to put aside past grudges and their vendettas: South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. This enables tripartite cooperation in the key areas of defense and technological security.
It is still early to talk about an Asian NATO, but this triangle is added to the Aukus military entity (the joint defense in the Pacific between the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia) and the Quad geopolitical club, which unites four Indo-Pacific democracies (with the USA always in the center, in this case surrounded by India Japan Australia).
For Xi Jinping's propaganda, all this is evidence that America is fostering a "Cold War mentality". But Beijing is not immune to this syndrome. The desire to recently celebrate the 70th anniversary of the "victory" against the United States in the 1953 Korean War - launched by an aggression of the communist North against the South - together with representatives of Putin and Kim Jong-Un, was a gesture , with which China betrayed its nostalgic version of the block clash.
The Camp David summit is held under the banner of two main themes: the sharing of values between liberal democracies and security. The objective is strong: the so-called "institutionalization" of relations between the three allies. What does it mean? It means giving permanent structure to their relationship, which ranges from intelligence cooperation to missile defense to policies to protect technological know-how. The immediate and obvious threat to confront is North Korea, which continues to intensify its missile tests and build-up of nuclear arsenals. After that comes a less direct but immanent threat: the People's Republic's military expansionism in that area. Institutionalisation, for example by creating a permanent triangle secretariat, gives the idea that the comparison with NATO is appropriate, even if in the Far East we are still at a very embryonic stage compared to the military structures of the Atlantic Alliance. Institutionalization also means ensuring the stability of relations between allies beyond the political situation and election cycles: ensuring that advanced military cooperation cannot be called into question, despite any change of government in Seoul (where elections are imminent), in Tokyo and of course , also in Washington.
What goes without saying is that allies should calm down in the event of Donald Trump's return to the White House. The prospect of Trump winning next year's election worries the Japanese and South Koreans, given the Republican candidate's isolationist streak and disdain for alliances. That concern has already had one effect that many consider troubling: the reopening of a debate in both Japan and South Korea about building autonomous nuclear weapons so they don't depend on American deterrence. So far, the majority of South Korean public opinion is in favor of the atomic weapon: this is understandable, given the nuclear power of North Korea in the hands of Kim Jong-Un. Washington's strategic doctrine is against such nuclear proliferation, even among allies. America has always thought it was dangerous, the Pentagon believes that a nuclear arms race between Tokyo and Seoul could destabilize the region. But if the United States wants to block this evolution, it must give guarantees that its nuclear umbrella will continue to protect friends in the Far East: this is another compelling rationale behind the Camp David summit and the objective of institutionalizing the alliance , so they can survive, no matter who comes to the White House in 2024 or beyond.
Other topics on the agenda of the summit are the border between defense, security and economy. The resilience of industrial production chains will be at the heart of the discussion: how to avoid falling at the mercy of Chinese supplies, especially in technology sectors such as semiconductors, electric batteries, essential materials (minerals and rare metals) where the People's Republic has so far a dominant position.
Those meeting at Camp David are the leaders of the three technology superpowers: they will discuss their respective adherence to Joe Biden's embargo on advanced technology supplies to Beijing. Japan, and even more so South Korea with Samsung, have industrial lobbies for which losing the Chinese market would be a huge sacrifice. A giant like Samsung has so far continued to sell semiconductors to the People's Republic and manufacture them in factories it owns in China, even if it recently agreed to stop supplying some sophisticated types. In addition, Japan and South Korea are attracted by the generous subsidies that Biden offers to those who build new semiconductor factories on American soil. Here we find a familiar theme in the dialogue between the United States and the European Union: allies, even as they converge in their analysis of the Chinese threat, they are critical of forms of American protectionism by which they see themselves harmed. It is a terrain in which Biden must offer compromises, lest he feel accused of implementing his own version of the Trumpian "America First" slogan.
If the embryo of an "Asian NATO" is destined to be born at Camp David - with all the odds - it will come in any case because of Xi Jinping's policy. Ongoing incidents in the South China Sea (again recently against the Philippines) have raised the level of concern about Beijing's aggressiveness. The same applies to the issue of Taiwan, which hangs over the summit. The relegitimization of Kim Jong-Un, who only a decade ago was treated as a traitor by the Chinese themselves, and is now coddled as a respected ally (as well as Putin's arms supplier); Xi Jinping's choice to actually support aggression against Ukraine: all of this has given rise to self-defensive dynamics in the Far East that are not very different from those taking place in Europe.
*Corriere della Sera