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The price of the future

2022-05-13 13:54:35Pikëpamje SHKRUAR NGA DITMIR BUSHATI
The price of the future
Photo posted on FB by Ditmir Bushati

It is hard to believe, but impossible to deny that the international order that has kept most of the world afloat since the end of the Cold War has collapsed as a result of Russia's occupation of Ukraine. More than two months of war and an escalating humanitarian, security, economic and political situation are clear evidence of a completely changed landscape of the security environment, facing anarchy and the need for an international order. based on rules.
Until yesterday we were used to an international order that worked according to the motto "Never Again"! There would never be genocide and war crimes again. Larger nations would never delete smaller nations from the map. Few thought of this war in Europe in 2022, after the bloody wars in the former Yugoslavia. It is hard to imagine another biblical exodus to Europe, like the one happening to Ukrainians who want to escape the clutches of war.
After the Cold War, we witnessed a clash between liberal values, on the one hand, and nationalism, on the other. Belief in history nurtured our belief in the triumph of democratic values. However, the people of Ukraine and their war are showing us that both of these concepts can coexist. Ukrainians are showing that it is possible to be a patriot and believe in an open and democratic society.


HOW SHOULD I FINISH THIS WAR?
While the resistance of the Ukrainian people is impressive, the ongoing war has focused the debate mainly on the means: on the quantity and quality of military armaments offered to the country, on the establishment of a no-fly zone over Ukrainian airspace, as well as on the extent of economic sanctions against Russia. Little has been said about what needs to be done to end the war and whether its end is on the horizon. It remains to be seen whether the end of the war will be formalized by a treaty signed by Russia and Ukraine, and internationally guaranteed, or simply accepted as a reality.

The answer to the question of how this war should end is vital. History teaches us that wars can end when a major rift arises between the warring parties so that one side can decide to end it, or when both sides realize that complete victory is not on the horizon and decide it is better. to agree rather than bear the costs of continuing the war. In each case, they have seized it, despite obstacles we can scarcely imagine. " Or the war could simply end de facto without a formal peace, as in the case of the Korean and Persian Gulf wars.

Of course, Ukrainians have every right to set their own goals for the war. And the primary objective remains the liberation of the country. These objectives are inevitably influenced by the development of events and dynamics on the ground. However, events on the ground do not necessarily have to set objectives. Policy goals should affect what is required on the ground.

The Russians, on the other hand, have abandoned the idea of ​​"negotiations." President Putin's meeting with UN Secretary-General Guterres did not produce results in de-escalating the situation on the ground, but only a few steps in the humanitarian plan regarding the evacuation of civilians in the devastated city of Mariupol. Putin even denied violating Ukraine's territorial integrity and involving Russian forces in war crimes.

Besides Ukraine, the allies that support it in this war also have objectives. It must be said that the interests of the allies overlap with those of Ukraine. They are broader, including nuclear stability with Russia and the ability to influence the progress of Iran and North Korea's nuclear programs. The geopolitical reconfiguration, with the UN vote condemning Russian aggression in Ukraine and the suspension of Russia by the Human Rights Council, where some states with democratic governance and weight in the international arena abstained, is not promising for the West in addressing its challenges. especially related to climate change.

TWO LESSONS FROM HISTORY
Looking at this context, it is important to consider two lessons from the Cold War period. The first has to do with the avoidance of direct armed conflict between the two main powers of the time, despite the strain in relations between them. The second has to do with accepting less than optimal results. For example, Soviet progress in Eastern Europe after Moscow suppressed the 1956 revolution in Hungary, and the 1968 revolution in Czechoslovakia, was accepted by the Americans, to avoid threatening vital Soviet interests.

This policy, otherwise known as the "doctrine of restraint", is attributed to the well-known American diplomat George Kennan. Over time, as Kennan suggested, the successful application of the policy of restraint could add to the pressures that would undermine communism, as it eventually did, after several decades.

The first lesson of the Cold War is reflected in the existing Allied policy towards Ukraine. From the beginning of the war it became clear that the Allies would not intervene militarily with their troops, nor would they establish a no-fly zone over Ukrainian airspace, as such an action could bring about Allied and Russian forces. in direct contact and increase the risk of escalation. Instead, the Allies opted for an indirect strategy of providing arms, intelligence and training to Ukraine, while increasing pressure on Russia with economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation.

The second lesson of the Cold War concerns the decision of the Allies to meet their objectives by limited means, which has worked to a considerable extent. This election, however, has not prevented Russia from destroying the urban centers of Ukraine, while the battle between the armed forces of the two countries has favored Ukraine.

THE PRICE OF WAR
At the current stage of the fighting the question that needs to be answered is whether the allies should continue to embrace limited goals, avoiding military attempts to expel Russia from all over Ukraine. The answer to this question becomes more important in conditions when the end of the war is not on the horizon. It is likely to continue mainly in eastern and southern Ukraine, although Russia will continue to attack other targets, as it attacked Kiev again during the UN Secretary-General's visit there.

The elements of a strategy for a long-term war whose end is not known are well known. Therefore, the best way to deal with it is to provide the weapons, ammunition, training and intelligence that Ukraine needs to defend itself against Russia. Likewise, the Allies are expected to gradually expand sanctions, achieving the greatest degree of isolation ever imposed on a G-20 member state. At this point the US has taken most of the measures available. For Europeans, the remaining steps are particularly painful, due to their interdependence with the Russian economy.

The change of course in Germany, in relation to the policy of defense spending, and the warning of an escalating embargo on Russian oil, clearly speak of the preparations of the Europeans to pay the price of the war whose end is not known. The first hurdle seems to have been overcome, when Moscow decided to cut gas supplies to Poland and Bulgaria, as EU member states reacted quickly, securing some of their gas to make up for unexpected losses from Russian gas supplies. .

In the near future, we are unlikely to see a peace treaty, a real end to the conflict or regime change in Russia. Therefore, for now it seems that the goal is for Russia not to own more territory than it had before the invasion of Ukraine and to continue to refrain from using weapons of mass destruction. Over time, the West may combine the application of sanctions and diplomacy, with the aim of completely withdrawing the Russian military from Ukraine.

THE CHANGED SECURITY LANDSCAPE
Over the past two centuries Russia has been invaded three times, once by France and twice by Germany. While during the Cold War, Soviet forces were always ready to fight against US and NATO forces in Europe, since the end of the Cold War, the Russians have objectively enjoyed greater security. Although NATO has expanded eastward, accepting states that were once part of the Warsaw Pact, Russia has enjoyed unprecedented security on its western flank. Moscow even welcomed what is considered the alliance's most important move since the fall of the Berlin Wall: a reunited Germany included within NATO structures.

But although unprovoked and more secure than before, Russia under Putin has not adapted, nor has it accepted this reality. Throughout history, other major powers such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan have adapted to similar changes. However, unlike the United Kingdom, France, and to some extent Japan, Russia has not had a history of friendly relations and strategic cooperation with the United States. On the contrary.

Unlike Germany and Japan, Russia has not been defeated militarily. And unlike Germany, which became an economic power after World War II, Russia does not believe in the "economic miracle." Russia has viewed its integration into the post-Cold War international order with suspicion, fearing that it would not have the power to determine the fate of security in Europe and the world.

George Kennan said, "Russia's tragedy is that it sees Ukraine either as its vassal or as its enemy." As Russia consumes its "tragedy" in Ukraine, we are faced with a changing security landscape in Europe, where NATO appears more united. NATO enlargement to countries that have traditionally been considered neutral is more likely because of this changing security landscape.

Paradoxically, such a thing is impossible for Ukraine, at least in the near future. So far, Finland and Sweden seem ready to join the alliance. And the latter ready to welcome them, initially through a political pledge at the Madrid Summit, which is expected to be held at the end of June. The accession of these countries to NATO will bring innovations to the alliance, including advanced air and naval capabilities, thus helping to prevent further Russian aggression.

Just as the collapse of the Soviet Union prompted Sweden and Finland to reconsider their relations with the EU, the consumption of the Russian "tragedy" in Ukraine has prompted them to reconsider basic elements of security policy, including their relationship with NATO. -n. Perhaps the most important consequence of Finland and Sweden's accession to NATO will be the growing political power of the alliance as the backbone of defending Europe and the transatlantic space. The accession of the two countries to NATO helps facilitate a more capillary coordination between the EU and NATO, thus contributing to a better burden-sharing across the Atlantic.

Also, NATO's Asian allies Japan and South Korea are planning to attend the Madrid Summit, thus forming a larger and more cohesive coalition, as a unifying force against the Russian threat. In this changing security landscape, it is important for this coalition to include in various forms of partnership the countries of the Western Balkans and those of the Eastern Partnership, which are not yet members of NATO. States that are willing to contribute to security by paying the price of the future in freedom and prosperity.
* Analysis published for the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Tirana Foundation


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