Wars are defining factors in history. Wars that go wrong, and which serve as the culmination of a more general national decline, can prove fatal. This is especially true of empires. The Habsburg Empire, which ruled central Europe for hundreds of years, might have survived despite decades of decline had it not been for its defeat in World War I.
The same is true for the Ottoman Empire, which in the middle of the 19th century began to be called the "Sick of Europe". So the Ottoman Empire, like that of the Habsburgs, could have existed for many decades, and even reformed, if it was not also on the side of the losers of the First World War.
But the subsequent consequences of such an imperial blunder should not be underestimated either. Empires are formed out of chaos, and their fall often leaves chaos. The more mono-ethnic states that rose from the ashes of the multi-ethnic Habsburg and Ottoman empires often proved radical and unstable.
This is because ethnic and sectarian groupings and their particular grievances, which had been kept under control under common imperial "umbrellas", suddenly intermingled and pitted themselves against each other. In general, Nazism and fascism influenced states and radical factions in the post-Habsburg and post-Ottoman Balkans, but also Arab intellectuals who studied in Europe, and who took these ideas with them to their newly independent post-colonial homelands. , where they helped shape the disastrous ideology of Baathism.
Winston Churchill declared at the end of World War II that if the imperial monarchies in Germany, Austria and elsewhere had not been overthrown by the decisions of the Versailles Peace Conference "there would have been no Hitler".
The 20th century was largely shaped by the decline of dynastic empires in the early decades, and by war and subsequent geopolitical turmoil in the later decades. The Empire is much looked down upon by intellectuals, but its fall could bring even greater problems.
The Middle East, for example, has not yet found a suitable solution after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. And this is seen in its bloody vicissitudes during the last 100 years. This should be borne in mind when considering the vulnerability of China, Russia and the United States today.
These great powers may be even more fragile than they appear. So far, Russia and the United States have launched self-destructive wars. Russia in Ukraine and the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq. As for China, its obsession with conquering Taiwan could lead to self-destruction.
All three major world powers have shown periods of very poor judgment in recent years and decades regarding their long-term survival. If any or all of the current great powers were to be greatly weakened, confusion and disorder would increase not only within their own borders but throughout the world. A weakened US would be less able to support its allies in Europe and Asia.
If the Kremlin regime is shaken by factors stemming from the war in Ukraine, Russia, which is institutionally weaker than China, could become a version of the former Yugoslavia, unable to control its territories. historical in the Caucasus, Siberia and East Asia.
Economic or political turmoil in China could cause regional unrest within the country, but also embolden India and North Korea, whose policies are constrained by Beijing. Current great powers are not empires. But Russia and China retain traces of their imperial heritage.
The Kremlin's war in Ukraine has its roots in impulses that existed both in the Russian and Soviet empires. Meanwhile, China's aggressive intentions towards Taiwan echo the Qing dynasty's ambition to dominate Asia. The United States has never been officially identified as an empire.
But westward expansion into North America and occasional overseas territorial conquests gave the US an imperial "flavor" during the 19th century and in the post-World War II era, when it has enjoyed a level of global dominance since it was only known to empires.
Today, all three of these great powers face an uncertain future in which collapse or even some degree of disintegration cannot be ruled out. The range of problems is different for each, but the challenges each country faces are central to the very existence of that power.
Russia currently faces the most immediate danger. Even if it somehow dominates the war in Ukraine, it has to face the economic catastrophe of breaking away from the EU and the G-7 economies, in case there is no real peace, which for now seems unlikely.
Russia may now be the "Sick of Eurasia", as the Ottoman Empire once was to Europe. As for China, its annual economic growth has been slowing from double-digit to single-digit figures, and may soon hit a multi-decade low.
Capital has left the country. Foreign investors are selling billions of dollars in Chinese bonds and stocks. Likewise, foreign investments have decreased, its population has aged, and the labor force has declined. All this does not bode well for the internal stability of the country in the future.
The United States is a democracy, so its problems are more transparent. But that doesn't necessarily make them any less sharp. The fact is that while the federal deficit is growing to alarming levels, the very process of globalization has divided Americans into 2 opposing factions: those who share the values of a new cosmopolitan world-wide civilization, and those who reject it for the sake of a more more traditional world.
The oceans are less and less of a factor in separating the United States from the rest of the world. The US was a great democracy that functioned well in the era of repression in various countries. But it has far less success in the digital age, whose innovations fueled the populist anger that led to Donald Trump's presidential election.
Because of these changes, a new configuration of global power is likely to occur. Under this scenario, Russia will suffer a rapid decline due to its misguided war in Ukraine. China will find it very difficult to remain a viable economic and technological power under a Chinese Communist Party that is increasingly returning to orthodox Leninism.
Meanwhile, the United States will manage to overcome its internal turmoil, and will re-emerge as a unipolar power, as it did immediately after the Cold War. Another possibility is a truly bipolar world, in which China maintains its economic dynamism even as it becomes more authoritarian.
A third scenario is the gradual decline of the three powers, leading to a greater degree of anarchy in the international system, with the protagonism of middle-level powers, especially those in the Middle East and South Asia, and European states. Which scenario will emerge will depend a lot on the outcome of the military contests. And this includes the war in Ukraine, but also the US-China confrontation over Taiwan.
Note: Robert D. Kaplan, head of the geopolitics department at the Foreign Affairs Research Institute. / Taken with abbreviations from "Foreign Affairs" - Bota.al