The fierce race of the 21st century to become the next economic superpower

2024-05-09 10:50:38Kosova&Bota SHKRUAR NGA REDAKSIA VOX

The fierce race of the 21st century to become the next economic superpower

By 2050 there will be a new map of economic power, always if things go according to plan. Narendra Modi, India's prime minister, wants the country's per capita Gross Domestic Product to cross the World Bank's upper income threshold three years ahead of schedule. Indonesia's leaders think they have until the middle of the century to catch up with the rich countries. Mid-century is also the deadline for many of Mohammed bin Salman's so-called "Vision 2030" reforms. Saudi Arabia's crown prince wants to transform his country from an oil producer to a diversified economy. Other smaller countries, including Chile, Ethiopia and Malaysia, have their own schemes.

The paths are different, but they all have something in common: breathtaking ambition. Officials in India think GDP growth of 8% a year is needed to meet Prime Minister Modi's target, or 1.5 percentage points more than India has grown on average over the past three decades. Indonesia will need growth of 7% per year, up from an average of 4.6% over the same period. While the future economy of Saudi Arabia, which will no longer depend on oil, will have to grow by 9% per year, from an average of 2.8% in the last 3 decades. Although 2023 was a good year for all three of these countries, none of them experienced growth at this kind of pace. Very few countries have maintained such growth for five years, let alone 30 years.

There is no specific recipe for such significant growth, but to increase prosperity, economists usually prescribe liberal reforms of the kind that have been supported by the IMF and the World Bank since the 1980s under the label of the "Washington Consensus." Among the widely adopted policies are prudent fiscal policies and a stable exchange rate. Today, technocrats demand looser competition rules and the privatization of state-owned firms.

However, these proposals are ultimately about removing barriers to growth, not supporting it. William Easterly of New York University has calculated that, even among the 52 countries that had the most stable policies according to the "Washington Consensus," GDP growth averaged only 2% per year from 1980 to 1998. But Modi and Prince Muhammad is not willing to wait, they want to develop quickly. The goal is to achieve the kind of meteoric growth that East Asian countries experienced in the 1970s and 1980s. As globalization spread, these countries made the most of mass and cheap labor, gaining an advantage in the car markets (Japan), the electronics (South Korea) and pharmaceuticals (Singapore).

Industries were built behind the protectionist walls of their borders, which restricted imports, but then flourished when trade with the rest of the world was encouraged. Foreign companies later brought the knowledge and capital needed to produce more complex and profitable goods, increasing productivity. No wonder, then, that leaders across the developing world remain enthusiastic about manufacturing. In 2015, Modi announced plans to increase the industry's share of India's GDP to 25%, from 16% at the time. "Sell anywhere, but make in India," Modi urged business leaders. Cambodia hopes to double its factory exports, excluding clothing, by 2025. Kenya wants to see its manufacturing sector grow by 15% a year.

However, there is a catch. Industrialization is even harder to drive than it was 40 or 50 years ago. As a result of technological advances, fewer workers are needed than ever before to produce, say, a pair of socks. In India, five times fewer workers were required to operate a factory in 2007 than in 1980. Around the world, industry now runs on skills and capital, which rich countries have in abundance, and less on labor , which means that a mass and cheap labor force does not offer much towards economic development. For that reason, Modi and others have a new game plan: they want to move forward toward closed-loop manufacturing. Why bother sewing a pair of socks when you can manufacture semiconductors?

"This incredible obsession with getting things done with technology," as one former Indian government adviser puts it, sometimes leads to old-fashioned protectionism. Indian companies may be welcome to sell anywhere, but Mr. Modi wants Indians to buy Indian products. He has announced a ban on imports of everything from laptops to weapons.

Në disa vende, ka pasur sukses të hershëm. Sektori i prodhimit në Kamboxhia prodhoi tre pikë përqindje më shumë në PBB-në e vendit vitin e kaluar, sesa pesë vjet më parë. Firmat që kërkojnë të diversifikohen nga Kina janë joshur nga kostot e ulëta, subvencionet për prodhimin e teknologjisë së lartë dhe investimet shtetërore. Megjithatë, gjetkë gjërat po rezultojnë më të vështira. Në Indi, sektori i manifakturës ka qënë i qëndrueshëm në raport me PBB-në. Por, emra të mëdhenj si Apple dhe Tesla kanë vendosur markat e tyre në një ose dy fabrika, por kanë shfaqur një dëshirë të ulët për të bërë investimet që dikur bënin në Kinë, e cila ofron infrastrukturë superiore dhe një fuqi punëtore më të arsimuar.

Rreziku është se, në përpjekje për të tërhequr manifakturën e teknologjisë së lartë, vendet përfundojnë duke përsëritur fatkeqësitë e së kaluarës. Nga viti 1960 deri në vitin 1991 pjesa e prodhimit në PBB-së në Indi u dyfishua. Por kur barrierat mbrojtëse u hoqën në vitet 1990, asgjë nuk ishte aq e lirë sa të eksportohej në pjesën tjetër të botës. Rreziku është veçanërisht i madh këtë herë, pasi zoti Modi e sheh prodhimin si sinonim të aftësisë së Indisë për të prodhuar gjithçka që i nevojitet, veçanërisht teknologjinë për armët. Së bashku me Indonezinë dhe Turqinë, India është mes atyre vendeve që e shohin pasurimin si rrugë drejt një pozicioni më të fortë gjeopolitik, por duke rritur mundësinë e investimeve të orientuara keq.

Këto të meta si në prodhimtarinë bazë ashtu edhe në përpjekjet për të ecur përpara, po ndihmojnë të bindin disa vende të provojnë një qasje tjetër: tërheqjen e industrive që përdorin burimet e tyre natyrore, veçanërisht metalet dhe mineralet që fuqizojnë tranzicionin e gjelbër. Qeveritë në Amerikën Latine janë të prirura ta bëjnë këtë. Po kështu edhe Republika Demokratike e Kongos dhe Zimbabve. Por është Indonezia ajo që po udhëheq rrugën, dhe e bën këtë me ashpërsi të madhe. Që nga viti 2020, vendi ka ndaluar eksportet e boksitit dhe nikelit, nga të cilat prodhon 7% dhe 22% të furnizimit global. Zyrtarët shpresojnë se duke i mbajtur nën kontroll, mund t’i detyrojnë rafineritë të zhvendosen në vendin e tyre. Më pas ata duan të përsërisin këtë model edhe në faza apo sektorë të tjerë, derisa punëtorët indonezianë të bëjnë gjithçka, nga përbërësit e baterive e deri te turbinat e erës. Zyrtarët po ofrojnë gjithashtu subvencione, si në formën e parave “cash”, ashtu edhe në formën e lehtësive. Indonezia është në mes të një bumi infrastrukturor: shpenzimet midis 2020 dhe 2024 duhet të arrijnë në 400 miliardë dollarë, mbi 50% më shumë në vit sesa në vitin 2014.

This includes the financing of at least 27 billion-dollar industrial parks, most notably the Kalimantan Park, built on an area of ​​13,000 hectares in the former Bornean rainforest, at a cost of $129 billion. Also, other countries are offering incentives. Firms that want to install solar panels in Brazil will receive subsidies. Bolivia nationalized its lithium industry, but new state conglomerates will be allowed to enter into joint ventures with Chinese companies.

Fossil fuels have made several countries of the Persian Gulf, as almost every industry in the world constantly consumes oil. There is no guarantee that the wealth of green metals will be so great, as batteries for example are replaced once every few years. Officials at the International Energy Agency think the gains from green commodities will peak in the coming years, then taper off.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) was among the first countries in the region to diversify. This country is focused on industries such as transportation and tourism, as well as high-tech industries such as artificial intelligence (AI) and chemicals. Abu Dhabi is already home to the Louvre and New York University, and there are plans to monetize space travel for tourists. Qatar is building Education City, a campus that will cost $6.5 billion and span 1,500 hectares, working as an industrial park for universities.

Saudi Arabia hopes to see foreign investment flows rise to 5.7% of GDP in 2030, up from 0.7% in 2022, and is spending fabulous sums of money in pursuit of this ambition. The Public Investment Fund has disbursed $1.3 trillion over the past decade, a figure greater than the amount expected to be allocated by the Inflation Reduction Act, which is President Joe Biden's industrial policy in America. The fund is spending on everything from soccer teams and petrochemical plants to entirely new cities. Industrial policy has never been developed on such a scale.

However, the way countries are growing is changing. Manufacturing has been the only type of work where poor countries have improved their productivity at a faster rate than rich countries. But modern industry may not offer the same benefit. Instead of spending time trying to make factory processes more efficient, workers in countries trying to get rich by extracting green metals work in an extremely low-productivity industry, catering to tourists, a sector other with low productivity and assemble electronic devices, instead of dealing with more complex processes. All this means that the race to get rich in the 21st century will be more grueling than that of the 20th.


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