Ever since Russia failed to invade Ukraine in the early weeks of the war, everyone has been repeating the same phrase for over two years: that there is no end in sight to the war. But in recent weeks, the situation has changed, driven by movements on the battlefield and the public statements of US President-elect Donald Trump, who returns to the White House on January 20. He has vowed to end Europe's biggest conflict since World War II within a day or two.
So, will the war in Ukraine end in 2025?
If by conclusion is meant a peace agreement, then no, many analysts estimate – mainly because Russian President Vladimir Putin opposes this idea, unless Moscow will have a degree of dominance over Ukraine, something unacceptable to Kiev and its allies.
Experts believe that Putin wants Russia to pose a constant threat to Ukraine and challenge the West, which he considers the aggressor in the civilizational confrontation.
Ukrainians, on the other hand, do not want peace if it means the final surrender of part of their territory to Russia, and if they have to give up demands that Russia be held accountable for the crimes it has committed against Ukraine and its people.
"I think we are very, very far from ending the war," said Nigel Gould-Davies, senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.
Calls for a ceasefire are very likely, given Trump's promises to end the war quickly. Likewise, the possibility of starting negotiations is also high.
"The situation is such that [Trump] can convince the Russians and Ukrainians to talk to him and to each other," Olga Oliker, director of the Europe and Central Asia program at the Crisis Group, said in several responses to Radio Free Europe.
"We could see some kind of de facto ceasefire, if not de jure, some kind of negotiations, whatever the format, around 2025," said Sam Greene, a professor at the Russia Institute at King's College London, in several responses to Radio Free Europe.
Land and security
There are many pitfalls within a ceasefire, including the risk that Russia could use it as an opportunity to regroup and launch attacks again, unless the Ukrainians are reinforced with advanced defenses.
There are also many obstacles to reaching an agreement, some arising from the very extreme positions that the parties hold on essential aspects of the conflict.
One of them is territory. A ceasefire agreement seems more likely now than in the past, given the signs that Ukraine has shown, according to Oliker – “crushing fatigue” – as a result of Russia’s continued victories on the battlefield. It may therefore be prepared for some agreement that the lands now controlled by Moscow would remain under Russian control for a temporary and unofficial period.
But that wouldn't be enough for Putin. He and other Russian officials have said that recognizing the four Ukrainian provinces as Russian territory is non-negotiable, and that this position is unacceptable to Kiev.
Another major obstacle is due to the need for serious and effective security guarantees for Ukraine.
Russia is adamant in its opposition to Ukraine's membership in NATO.
One of Moscow's main demands before the start of the full-scale war was a guarantee that Kiev would never become a member of the North Atlantic alliance. Analysts believe that the Kremlin will be out of any agreement that could foresee Ukraine's eventual membership in the Western military organization.
If Kiev's Western supporters try to approach this talk, to construct a content that does not sound like a form of guarantee, Putin will make it clear that he does not accept it, Gould-Davies estimates.
"It's very, very difficult what it could look like," he said, regarding a security guarantee for Ukraine that would be favorable to both sides.
'His theories of victory'
There has been a lot of discussion in recent weeks about the idea of sending Western troops into Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire. However, even on this point there are disagreements in Europe, and Russia could not be happier.
"The Kremlin does not want to see Western troops, especially NATO troops, across the ceasefire lines of control," Greene said, because "Russia will aim to maintain the power of initiative. It wants to be in control when it comes to escalation, and it does not want to see the other parties, whether the Ukrainians or the West, balanced."
"The question is whether [Kiev or the West] will be able to push Moscow into a position where it has no option but to accept that kind of deal," he said.
Although Russia has made little progress on the battlefield, its economy is far from collapse, despite warning signs and uncertainty about future Western support for Ukraine.
"At this point, [Putin] believes that his theory of victory is being proven, that Russia is big enough and tough enough to inflict great damage and costs on its small enemy, Ukraine, in the long term, but also to keep the West politically irritated," Gould-Davies said.
“Diçka që mund të ndryshojë këtë situatë dhe ta detyrojë Putinin të ketë qasje tjetër në të ardhmen, është nëse do të ketë presion të vërtetë nga administrata Trump, duke e kërcënuar me kosto të madhe nëse vazhdon lufta, dhe nëse e bën Putinin të besojë se edhe regjimi i tij mund të rrezikohet”, ka thënë ai.
Përtej sugjerimit se do të përdorë ndihmën për Ukrainën si mjet ndikimi mbi Kievin dhe Moskën, Trump ka thënë pak për mënyrën se si shpreson t’i japë fund luftës.
Teksa pret nisjen e mandatit të ri të Trumpit, Putin duket se po luan lojë të dyfishtë, diçka që e bën shpesh, duke dërguar mesazhe kontroverse – duke e përshkruar Rusinë si konstruktive dhe të përgatitur për koncesione, por edhe duke përjashtuar çdo mundësi që mund të jetë e pranueshme për Kievin dhe Perëndimin.
Duke marrë shembull konferencën e fundit me gazetarë, që ka zgjatur mbi katër orë, ai ka thënë shpesh se Rusia është e gatshme për kompromise me Ukrainën, por ka thënë edhe shumë gjëra tjera që e kanë sugjeruar të kundërtën.
‘Gjithçka rrotullohet te lufta”
Putin e konsideron presidentin ukrainas, Volodymyr Zelensky si lider jolegjitim, me të cilën nuk do të nënshkruante një marrëveshje. Ai ka dhënë edhe sinjale që e ashtuquajtura Komunikatë e Stambollit – një marrëveshje kornizë që ka qarkulluar pak para se të dështonin bisedimet mes Moskës dhe Kievit në ditët e para të luftës – duhet të shërbejë patjetër si bazë për negociata.
“Ajo çfarë dëshiron të thotë Putini është se pikat e asaj marrëveshjeje përcaktojnë një Ukrainë neutrale, që jo vetëm se i ndalohet anëtarësimi në NATO, por parashihet edhe çmilitarizimi i saj, dhe kështu mund të jetë shënjestër tepër e lehtë për Rusinë në të ardhmen”, ka thënë analisti për Rusinë, Mark Galeotti. “Ai po tenton ta bëjë procesin sa më të çuditshëm, por ndërkohë të tingëllojë sa më fleksibil që është e mundur”, ka thënë Galeotti në podkastin e tij më 22 dhjetor.
Greene ka sugjeruar se Rusia mund të jetë e përgatitur “të zvogëlojë dhunën” dhe të konsiderojë ndonjë armëpushim, vetëm nëse Putini është i bindur që Moska do të vazhdojë të kërcënojë Ukrainën dhe do të ketë ende mospajtime me Perëndimin.
“Ekonomia ruse është duke funksionuar vetëm për shkak të luftës. Sistemi politik rus është i ndërtuar rreth luftës. Kjo flet për nivelin e centralizimit, shtypjes, kontrollit ideologjik”, ka thënë ai për Radion Evropa e Lirë.
“Nëse Rusia arrin me sukses te armëpushimi, besoj se do ta gjejë veten duke tentuar të mbajë një nivel përballjeje që e ka aktualisht me Ukrainën, por edhe me gjithë Perëndimin”.
‘Gabim i madh’
Oliker beson që edhe me pozicionet e ashpra të Rusisë për çështjet e territorit, një marrëveshje nuk është e pamundshme, nëse palët ulen për të negociuar.
“Ekziston avantazhi i nisjes së bisedimeve. Kur ato të nisin, njerëzit nisin t’i mendojnë koncesionet që nuk i kanë menduar para se të uleshin në tavolinë”, ka thënë ajo.
“Secili niset me idetë e tyre maksimale, secila mendon ashtu në fillim”.
The agreement may not be reached until 2025. However, if the talks are held and an agreement is drafted, analysts warn that Western countries should be careful not to flatter themselves and see this as a closed topic.
"Europe's response to any ceasefire will be very important - both for Ukraine and for itself," Ruth Deyermond, a senior lecturer in the Department of War Studies at King's College London, said in written comments to Radio Free Europe.
"As many states grapple with their own internal turmoil [often fueled by Russia], they may be tempted by the prospect of ending the conflict and may see this as an opportunity to revive ties with Russia. Such a move would be a grave mistake," she wrote.
"Russia will continue to pose a threat to European security."/ REL