How Serbia is benefiting from the Albania-Kosovo conflict

2023-06-14 18:40:14Pikëpamje SHKRUAR NGA JANUSZ BUGAJSKI
How Serbia is benefiting from the Albania-Kosovo conflict
Janusz Bugajski

Although Albanians often display their national unity in flag-waving, grandiose speeches and symbolic gestures, in reality conflicts over power and state formation simmer beneath the surface. In the case of Albania-Kosovo relations, political tensions and conflicting ambitions are now boiling over and the effect will primarily favor Serbia's regional agenda.

Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti has publicly criticized Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama for supporting President Aleksandar Vucic by helping to draft a statute for an autonomous Serbian entity in Kosovo without consulting Pristina. He also emphasized that Rama has failed to make a reciprocal proposal for Albanians in the Presheva valley, even though the eighth article of the Albanian constitution obliges Tirana to protect the rights of Albanians in all countries, especially in the Balkans.

In fact, Prishtina has a series of complaints against Tirana and especially against the current socialist government. Kosovo's leaders have raised serious questions about Rama's support for the Open Balkans initiative – a format that favors Serbian business and its expansionist objectives. The government in Tirana also demonstrates very little public solidarity with Pristina on vital issues in the dialogue with Belgrade. Indeed, it often seems that the personal ties between Rama and Vucic outweigh any concern for Kosovo's security and international integration.

However, a deeper game is at play. Rama believes that Tirana should be the center of the "Albanian world" with Pristina as a provincial capital. Such goals have outraged almost all political leaders in Kosovo, who see statehood as their crowning achievement after years of subservience to Serbia and Yugoslavia. Although Kurti has expressed possible support for a single Albanian state through democratic procedures and an open referendum, it is difficult to imagine his acceptance of a union with Albania in which Kosovo's status is reduced to a province. Moreover, the longer Kosovo exists as a state, the deeper is the sense of difference among its population and the refusal to submit again.

Rama presents a view of pan-Albanianism centered on Tirana, in which agreements can be made that go beyond the heads of Pristina's elected leaders. This also explains Tirana's silent support for the division of Kosovo during the Trump administration, in which the north would return to Serbia and the rest to Albania. Although the secret agreement was not made public, many details were revealed about the border changes involving Serbia and Albania. Trump's proposals were eventually shelved when they met stiff international resistance and threatened to set the region on fire.

The newest project envisages redistricting the region without changing borders and has apparently received approval in the Biden administration. The Western Balkans would be divided into three separate spheres of influence, with Belgrade, Tirana, and Zagreb gaining political and economic influence over smaller neighbors, including Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro. Under international pressure, it is assumed that smaller states would comply to supposedly ensure regional stability.

Kurti's criticism of Rama shows that the plan is known in Pristina and is further exasperating the relations between the two Albanian states. Paradoxically, after showing steadfast resistance to Belgrade's dominance for several decades, Prishtina must now demonstrate its resistance to Tirana's "big brother" syndrome. Kosovars will oppose attempts to limit their independence or schemes such as the Serbian "communal association", which will surely render the state politically dysfunctional. Indeed, Kurti should consider calling early elections to demonstrate how much public support the government actually has to resist pressures to concede ground to Belgrade.

Disputes between Albania and Kosovo and between Albanian leaders across state borders can be constructive if they lead to new initiatives and involve the public of both countries in discussions about a common future. However, the current dispute primarily serves the interests of the Vucic administration in three ways. First, the support from Tirana strengthens Belgrade's hand in the dialogue with Pristina. Second, it reduces Kosovo's position in both Washington and Brussels, while increasing Rama's reputation as a regional problem solver. And third, it feeds stereotypical Serbian accusations that Albanians are incapable of governing themselves and need a regional master.

Janusz Bugajski is a senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation in Washington DC. His latest book is The Failed State: A Guide to Breaking Russia. His upcoming book is titled "Poland in the lead: Europe's rising strategic player."

* The Geopost


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